: In democracies, leaders rely on a large coalition. Economic pain felt by the broader public directly threatens the leader's support base, making them more likely to concede.
The 2007 article "," published in the Journal of Conflict Resolution by David Lektzian and Mark Souva , argues that the effectiveness and initiation of economic sanctions depend heavily on the political institutions of the target state. Core Argument: The "Winning Coalition" 2007. An Institutional Theory of Sanctions Onse...
: For sanctions to work, they must create enough political pressure on the leader's "winning coalition"—the essential group of supporters needed to stay in power. : In democracies, leaders rely on a large coalition
Autocratic leaders benefit from the scarcity created by sanctions to reward loyalists. Core Argument: The "Winning Coalition" : For sanctions
The authors utilize the Selectorate Theory to explain why sanctions often fail against autocracies but are more effective against democracies:
: The authors suggest that majoritarian democratic politics may "overproduce" sanctions as a policy tool due to domestic demands from various interest groups within their own large winning coalitions. Summary of Hypotheses Institutional Effect Sanction Success
Beyond success rates, the paper explores why certain states are targeted in the first place: